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Social cognitive psychologists (Frith, 1992; Hardy-Baylé et al., 2003) sought to explain the
social problems and clarify the clinical picture of schizophrenia by proposing a model that
relates many of the symptoms to a problem of metarepresentation, i.e., theory of mind
(ToM). Given the differences in clinical samples and results between studies, and consid-
ering the wide range of what is considered to constituteToM, one must ask if there a core
function, or is ToM multifaceted with dissociable facets? If, there are dissociable dimen-
sions or facets, which are affected in patients with paranoid schizophrenia?To answer these
questions, a group of 21 individuals diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and 29 non-
clinical control subjects, were tested on a battery of five different measures of ToM. The
results confirmed that there was little difference in specificity of three of the tests in distin-
guishing between the clinical and non-clinical group, but there were important differences
in the shared variance between the tests. Further analyses hint at two dimensions although
a single factor with the same variance and the same contributing weights in both groups
could explain the results. The deficits related to the attribution of cognitive and affective
states to others inferred from available verbal and non-verbal information. Further analyses
revealed that incorrect attributions of mental states including the attribution of threatening
intentions to others, non-interpretative responses and incomplete answers, depending on
the test of ToM.




Theory of mind (ToM) is that cognitive function that allows an
individual to attribute information, beliefs, intentions, or feelings
to others, in order to explain and eventually predict their behav-
ior. This construct is both clinically and theoretically significant
as it furnishes a basis for the explanation of autistic semiology
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) as well as other clinical populations
such as Asperger’s syndrome (Happé et al., 1996) and demen-
tia (Gregory et al., 2002). Not only does this construct describe
a complex behavior but it also furnished new substance for the
study of normal development (see Wimmer and Perner, 1983;
Frith and Frith, 2003) and the neuroanatomic basis of this devel-
opment (e.g., Saxe and Powell, 2006). As such, the concept is an
essential tool that allows researchers and clinicians to better under-
stand normality, autism spectrum as well as other pathologies
in which social dysfunction is an important symptom, notably
schizophrenia.
SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THEORY OF MIND
Frith (1992) postulated that that deficits in meta representation are
at the origin of all cognitive aspects of schizophrenic symptomatol-
ogy (p. 122) which include mentalization or ToM. Schizophrenic
patients with negative symptoms are noted for poverty of content,
unawareness of intentions (p. 114), flattened affect, and social
withdrawal (Bodlakova et al., 1974). Others have described a lack
of ToM (Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007) errors of literal interpreta-
tions of mental states or overly simplistic inferences (Frith, 2004;
Montag et al., 2011, 2012). This characterization is supported by
data showing that schizophrenic patients tend to describe the phys-
ical appearance of peoples’ photographs rather than their state of
mind (Pilowsky and Bassett, 1980; Allen, 1984). They make overly
simplistic interpretations of state of mind of others, or ignore
completely the other’s state of mind (Montag et al., 2011). These
symptoms are also related to flattened affect, social withdrawal and
chronicity (Bodlakova et al., 1974). In contrast with these symp-
toms, Frith (2004) described another class of errors such as errors
in the prediction of behavior based on wrong beliefs, or ascrib-
ing significance to what others perceive as incidental or random
events (see also Blakemore et al., 2003) Other descriptions include
increased self-reference, an excessive interpretation, or over attri-
bution of beliefs or knowledge or a mental state to another (Frith,
2004), overgeneralization of hypotheses, or a hyper-ToM (Frith,
1994; Abu-Akel and Bailey, 2000; Abu-Akel, 2003; Montag et al.,
2012) or social inferential reasoning that goes beyond the bounds
of the context (Montag et al., 2011). Other manifestations include
www.frontiersin.org November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 432 | 1
Scherzer et al. Paranoid schizophrenia and theory of mind
increased self-reference (Frith, 2004), delusional beliefs, delu-
sions of reference, hallucinations, persecutory thoughts and disor-
ders monitoring, and interpreting others thoughts and intentions
(Frith, 1992; Abu-Akel and Bailey, 2000).
The Frith model of mentalization deficits in schizophrenia is
partially supported by the Bora et al. (2009a,b) and Sprong et al.
(2007) meta-analyses. In the latter case, the clinical groups were
found to be more than one SD below the mean of the control
subjects on different measures of ToM (d =−1.13). The ToM
deficit was more marked in the disorganized type of schizophrenia
(d =−2.23) and significantly greater than that of schizophrenic
subjects presenting a negative (d =−1.28) or paranoid sympto-
matology (d=−1.24) or in remission (d=−0.692). Other studies
showed negative correlations between the severity of delusions and
performance on the Hinting Task (Greig et al., 2004), between the
severity of symptoms of persecution and the results on a test of
first and second degree false beliefs (Harrington et al., 2005) and
between the severity of paranoid symptoms and the results on
a test of sarcasm (Kern et al., 2008). Finally, the performance of
paranoid schizophrenic (PScz) subjects on the Hinting Task is sig-
nificantly impaired compared with schizophrenic patients with
negative symptoms (Bora et al., 2008) and with schizophrenic
patients in remission on the Hinting Task, and tests of inferences
of mental states derived from cartoon strips (Corcoran et al., 1995,
1997). On the other hand Kosmidis et al. (2011) found group dif-
ferences in a first order false belief cartoon task, a hinting task, first
and second order false belief-verbal and deception-verbal tasks but
not on a task of attribution of intention or desire.
In their review of the literature, Couture et al. (2006) proposed
a model of social cognition and social functioning in schizophre-
nia similar to Frith (2004) in which a deficit of social cognition
is at the origin of social disturbance in schizophrenic patients.
This model is partially supported by correlations between mea-
sures of social cognition such as emotional and social perception,
ToM as well as styles of attribution, and measures of social func-
tioning in a hospital or community setting, social competence,
and social problem solving (Penn et al., 1997; Keltner and Kring,
1998; Couture et al., 2006; Meyer and Kurtz, 2009). Paranoid
schizophrenia patients share these characteristics but present par-
ticular social and cultural characteristics that distinguish them
from the general population of patients with schizophrenia and
other clinical populations. Studies have found a better ability to
perceive facial expressions of fear, anger, and sadness in patients
with PScz, compared with non-PScz patients (Penn et al., 1997,
2008; Keltner and Kring, 1998; Green and Phillips, 2004). As well,
patients with delusions of persecution require more time to name
the color of a threatening word compared with a neutral word
or a word related to depression and they tend to have a better
recall of threatening words and propositions. They also tend to
find significant associations between random words compared
with non-PScz patients (Penn et al., 1997; Green and Phillips,
2004).
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
To date, although studies of ToM and PScz patients seem to arrive
at the same findings of deficits, methodological differences would
tend to limit their construct validity. Deficits in ToM have been
related to positive (Mehl et al., 2010a) or negative (Kelemen et al.,
2005) or positive and negative (Greig et al., 2004) symptoms of
schizophrenia, to paranoid delusions (Mehl et al., 2010a), or not
(Greig et al., 2004), to the absence of a relationship between schiz-
ophrenia and ToM (Brüne, 2005; Montag et al., 2011). These
apparent contradictions can be attributed to differences in the
questions asked, in clinical samples (size, age, diagnosis – Kettle
et al., 2008) and differences in test batteries with the incumbent
distinctions in the processes that are involved in the specific ToM
task (Apperly, 2008).
From a methodological perspective, there is the problem of
the measure of ToM when the format is texts. This format solic-
its cognitive functions other than ToM, such as reading ability,
autobiographical memory, and working memory, the latter two
being impaired in schizophrenic patients (Daum, 2008; Mehl et al.,
2010b). Other cognitive functions that are related to reading texts
in general and have been found specifically in ToM are IQ and
executive functions (Corcoran et al., 1995). However, there is some
dispute over whether or not they adequately explain performance
on ToM tests (Corcoran et al., 1995; Penn et al., 1997; Langdon
and Coltheart, 1999; Brüne, 2003; Greig et al., 2004; Brüne and
Bodenstein, 2005; Pickup, 2006; Brüne et al., 2008). See however
Pickup and Frith (2001) for contrary findings.
Despite the link between ToM abilities in schizophrenia and
social abilities (Bora et al., 2008; Mehl et al., 2010b; Montag et al.,
2011), several teams of researchers have elaborated measures of
ToM that have been found to be more ecologically valid with differ-
ent clinical groups (Colussy and Zaruff, 1985; Davis and Stewart,
2001; Dziobek et al., 2006; Bazin et al., 2009; Bell et al., 2010; Mehl
et al., 2010a; Ouellet et al., 2010). These tasks consist of structured
interviews (e.g., Bosco et al., 2008; Morgan and David, 2010) or
more generally of a video presentation of real people in interaction
in social situations. As in any real-life situation, the information to
be processed is complex, in real time, involving visual and verbal
information with the interpretation at times being determined by
the context. One would expect such complexity to increase their
sensitivity to detect an impairment in social cognition in a clinical
population (Colussy and Zaruff, 1985; Davis and Stewart, 2001;
Bell et al., 2010).
HYPOTHESES
It is hypothesized that the performance of the clinical group will be
significantly impaired compared to that of the non-clinical group
on all five ToM tests. It is also postulated that the clinical group
will produce more incorrect attributions, excessive interpretation,
or over attribution of knowledge or a mental state to the third
party, than unawareness of intentions, errors of literal interpreta-
tions of mental states, incomplete, or overly simplistic inferences,
inasmuch as an attempt was made to limit the negative symptoms
in the clinical group, relative to positive symptoms. We also pos-
tulate that an ecological measure, Conversations and Insinuations
(C&I), a real-life test of ToM appropriate for an adult population,
will be more sensitive to deficits of ToM than questionnaires or
texts, in the clinical group. Equally important, given the wide vari-
ety of ToM tests used, of the diverse cognitive functions solicited
by each test, we hypothesize that the correlations between ToM
tests will be weak or not significant, thus raising the question of
the existence of different modules of ToM, some of which are more
impaired PScz than others.
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MATERIALS AND METHODS
The Comité institutionnel de déontologie et de la recherche de
l’Hôpital Louis-H. Lafontaine and the institutionally delegated
departmental Comité de déontologie of the Université du Québec
à Montréal approved of this project and all subjects gave their
free and informed written consent to participate in the study. The
treating psychiatrist of each patient took the necessary steps to
ensure that the patients were able to understand their rights, and
what was entailed and that their consent was freely given.
PARTICIPANTS
Two groups of participants, PSczs and a non-clinical group were
recruited for the study. The group of 21 patients was recruited
from the outpatient clinic Jeunes adultes of the Hôpital Louis-H.
Lafontaine by their respective psychiatrists. The clinical partici-
pants had to have been diagnosed with active (not in remission)
PScz by a psychiatrist, according to the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation (1994) DMS-IV diagnostic criteria. They had to obtain
a score of >4 on the scale of positive and negative symptoms
(PANSS) and on one or more of the following symptoms: delu-
sions, ideas of grandeur, or of persecution/suspicion. There had to
be no change in their antipsychotic medication for at least 2 weeks
before their participation and during their participation in this
study.
The 29 non-clinical control subjects were recruited from the
community via posters and in discussions with groups of individ-
ual. They had to have a sociodemographic profile (age, education,
family education) comparable to that of the clinical group and no
member of their direct family (parents, brothers, sisters) could
have been diagnosed with schizophrenia at any time prior to
their recruitment. They were recruited into the study following
a telephone interview of ∼20 min during which time they were
questioned about their personal and medical history in order
to ensure that they did not report any signs of Axis 1 or Axis 2
pathology, head trauma, or meet other exclusionary criteria.
All subjects were males, aged between 18 and 35, with French
their first language or language of instruction. Their IQ (VIQ, PIQ,
FSIQ) had to be ≥85. As well there could not be any Axis I or II
comorbidity, any neurologic impairment, or dysfunction, uncor-
rected visual defects, alcoholism, or addiction and they could not
be under the influence of recreational drugs or alcohol during
testing, as confirmed by a psychiatrist.
MATERIAL
Evaluation of the symptomatology
The severity of the symptomatology of the clinical subjects was
determined using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
(PANSS; Kay et al., 1986) during a semi-structured interview.
This scale is composed of three subscales measuring positive, neg-
ative, and general psychopathology. The 30 items of the Scale
are scored on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from absence of
an invalidating symptom in the past week to presence of such
a symptom. Each PANSS score was verified by an independent
psychiatrist.
IQ
The participants’ IQ was determined using the abridged French
version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III;
Wechsler, 1997). VIQ, PIQ, and FSIQ were determined according
to the following formula using raw scores (Pilgrim et al., 1999):
VIQ = 2 (Information+ Similarities)+ (Digit Span+ Arithmetic)
PIQ = 2 (Picture completion + Block design)+ (Substitution)
FSIQ is calculated according to the traditional method using
the scaled scores of the two indices.
Evaluation of theory of mind
Reading the mind in the eyes test. This test is sensitive to sub-
tle ToM deficits in a population of adults with autism spectrum
disorder (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). According to the authors it
measures the ability to infer the mental state without having to
infer the content (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Bora et al., 2008). The
test consists of 36 images of pairs of men’s and women’s eyes, pre-
sented one at a time to the subject who then has to choose between
four adjectives describing the cognitive or affective mental state of
the person behind the eyes. In this study we used a French version
of the test (Audrey Simion, www.autismresearchcenter.com). One
point is given for each correct answer for a total of 36 points.
Hinting task. This test has two versions of 10 stories each,
describing social interactions in which one person sends an indi-
rect message to another (e.g., a business man makes a subtle
comment to a colleague meant to tell him to let him rest for a
few minutes after having spent a long and hot day on the road;
Corcoran et al., 1995; Marjoram et al., 2005). Language is used to
convey a message that is not explicitly expressed, requiring certain
knowledge of the context to be able to correctly infer the intended
message. The stories are read to the subject who can follow along
on his copy of the text. The subject has to identify the indirect
message when first asked. If the answer is wrong, a cue is give and
the subject is asked a second question. Two points are given for the
unaided answer for a total of 40 points, one point for the correct
answer when cued, zero points if the answer is still wrong after
the cue.
The first version of this test was developed by Corcoran et al.
(1995) to investigate ToM in schizophrenic patients and the sec-
ond version was developed by Marjoram et al. (2005). In the latter
study the second version was significantly more difficult than the
first for both the clinical group and a non-clinical control group.
In this study a French translation of the two versions was used.
They were first translated by Emilie Boisseau then verified by Peter
Scherzer and whatever discrepancies remained were resolved fol-
lowing a discussion between the two. Each wrong answer to the
first question is independently scored by two judges on the basis
of three types of errors. There are non-interpretative errors, errors
of incomplete or implicit attributions, and errors of incorrect
attributions (Snowden et al., 2003).
Strange stories. Strange Stories has been used to investigate ToM
in a variety of populations. The test consists of eight stories requir-
ing social inferences (e.g., a captured soldier tells his captors where
his army’s assault vehicles are located knowing that his captors will
think that he is lying in order to protect his army) and eight stories
requiring physical inferences (Happé and Wimmer, 1998). The
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stories are read to the subjects who can follow along on their copy
of the text. The subject has to explain the behavior of the protago-
nist and answer a question. In this study a French version, validated
using the translation-retranslation method, was used. Two points
are given for a correct answer for a wrong answer for a total of
16 points, one point for an incomplete or ambiguous answer and
zero points.
Faux pas. This test is composed of 10 stories describing social
interactions in which one person, unintentionally says something
that is hurtful to another person (e.g., the winner of a writing
contest tells another contestant that it was easy to win because the
other stories were terrible, not knowing that this person was also a
contestant; Stone et al., 1998). The stories are read to the subjects
who can follow along on their copy of the text. After hearing and
reading each story, the subject is asked eight questions. A score of
one is given for each correct answer to each of six questions for
each faux pas for a maximum of 60 points and a score of zero is
given in the case of a wrong answer. The participant who receives
one point for question 4 (a woman threatens to drown a kitten if
nobody wants to buy it) automatically receives one point for ques-
tion 5. Subjects can then receive 20 more points for their written
comprehension of questions 7 and 8. Finally, each wrong answer to
question 4 is first categorized by two judges according to whether
it is incorrect, incomplete, or literal (Snowden et al., 2003). The
errors are then categorized as referring to internal states, person-
ality traits, bad, i.e., wrong intentions, the wrong good intentions,
or answers “don’t know” (Zalla et al., 2008).
This test is sensitive to subtle ToM deficits. The understand-
ing and correct interpretation of faux pas requires the ability to
attribute a cognitive and affective mental state to the person mak-
ing the faux pas and the recipient of the comment (Stone et al.,
1998). The English version was translated by Emilie Boisseau then
verified by Peter Scherzer. The few discrepancies were resolved
following a discussion between the two.
Conversations and insinuations. This test is a more real-life
test of ToM appropriate for an adult population (Ouellet et al.,
2010). The four clips that make up the test came from popular
daytime TV shows. Each clip is approximately 2 min in length,
with two to four characters (wife and husband, brother and sister,
grandmother and grandson, roommates) interacting in a vari-
ety of real-life situations (restaurant, hospital room, apartment,
kitchen). The subject has to make inferences in order to correctly
understand the social interactions as the TV characters make use
of indirect messages, faux pas, irony, and lies. Each scene is inde-
pendent of the rest of that episode with no references to preceding
episodes or other characters (see Ouellet et al., 2010 for a more
complete description).
There are three to six preprogrammed pauses for each video
clip with the pauses timed to occur after a social behavior or inter-
action, in order to ask the subject to explain what the subject did,
said, or feels. When questioned, the subject first answers sponta-
neously and then is given a multiple-choice question, regardless
of the first answer. The test is made up of a total of 21 multiple-
choice questions. These questions always ask for an interpretation
of the implicit message: of something said [“Why do you think
that he (she) said that”?], of an action [“why do you think he (she)
did that”?], or of a feeling [“How do you think that he (she) feels
now?”], depending on the content of the clip. Among the choice of
responses there is the correct response and three wrong answers,
presented in random order. The categories of wrong answers are
derived from Rowe et al. (2001). There are three types of wrong
answers: (1) non-interpretative (2) attribution of an erroneous
mental state (3) an inappropriate response. The wrong response
choices to questions related to the recognition of an affective
mental stage refer to a plausible but less precise emotion.
Two points are accorded to a correct response, one point for an
incomplete or inaccurate response that nevertheless has elements
of the correct response and zero if the answer is wrong. The subject
receives a supplementary point if he chooses the correct response
to the multiple-choice question. A total score is calculated for each
video clip for a grand total of 63 points. The sensitivity of this test
has already been demonstrated in a study of patients with multiple
sclerosis and a frontal lobe semiology (Ouellet et al., 2010).
PROCEDURE
The test battery was given over two sessions of ∼2 h each. The
sequence of ToM tests was counterbalanced between subjects.
The clinical participants were tested at the Center de recherche
Fernand–Séguin of the Hôpital Louis-H. Lafontaine and the con-
trol subjects were tested at the Université du Québec à Montréal.
All the participants received a remuneration of $8/h to compen-
sate them for their time, travel, and any inconvenience (Note: the
ethics committee of the Hôpital Louis-H. Lafontaine required that
all subjects be treated equally).
RESULTS
DATA DISTRIBUTIONS
Data analysis was preceded by inspection of within group dis-
tributions. Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET), Hinting
Task and C&I were reasonably symmetrical, with their skew-
ness index being smaller that one standard error in each group.
The skewness index exceeded two standard errors in the con-
trol group for Faux Pas (2.96, z =−6.82) and for Strange Stories
(−0.931, z =−2.15) while that for the patient group was accept-
able (0.795, z =−1.59, and 0.396, z = 0.79, respectively). The
transformations 2-log10(60.5-Faux Pas) and 5-sqrt(22-Strange
Stories) preserved the polarity of the scores and gave acceptable
skewness in each group, namely, for Faux Pas, 0.135 (z = 0.27) and
−0.468 (z = 1.08) in the patient and control groups respectively,
and for Strange Stories, 0.621 (z = 1.24) and −0.579 (z =−1.33)
for patients and controls.
SUBJECT CHARACTERISTICS
Student t -tests revealed significant differences between the clin-
ical and non-clinical groups. The clinical group was older, less
educated, and their IQ was lower (Table 1). However, there is no
evidence that an age and education difference of 2 years might
affect the results. Global IQ and schooling are significantly corre-
lated with all ToM tests with the exception of RMET (Table 2)
and were inserted as covariables in all analyses. A partial cor-
relation analysis between ToM scores in the clinical group and
demographic data and PANSS scores revealed significant corre-
lations after controlling for FSIQ and schooling. There was a
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Table 1 | Group demographic data and clinical characteristics of
schizophrenic patients.
Clinical Non-clinical t (48)
n=21 n=29
M (SD) M (SD)
Age 25.71 (4.44) 23.07 (3.2) 2.45*
Education (subjects) 10.71 (1.55) 12.03 (1.18) −3.42**
Education (parents) 11.94 (2.06) 12.91 (2.45) −1.38
FSIQ 99.95 (11.58) 110 (11.04) −3.11**
VIQ 100.81 (11.84) 110.14 (13.90) −2.47*
PIQ 98.24 (12.09) 111.03 (13.83) −3.40**
Age at diagnosis 21.57 (2.50)




-delusions (0–7) 4 (1.34)










Between-group comparisons: two-tailed t-tests for independent samples.
p<0.05, **p< 0.01.
significant correlation between RMET and symptoms of hostil-
ity (r = 0.73, p= 0.00), as well as between the performance on
C&I and symptoms of hallucinations (r =−0.63, p= 0.02).
ANALYSES OF ToMMEASURES
The extent to which the five tests of ToM together distin-
guish between groups was examined using a MANOVA using
transformed scores where applicable. This discriminated very
well between the groups (Wilks λ= 0.006, F(5,44)= 1470.1,
p< 0.0005. The individual variables gave the following results:
hinting task, F(1,48)= 87.66, p< 1e−8; C&I, F(1,48)= 57.13,
p< 1e−8; Faux pas, F(1,48)= 51.45, p< 1e−8; Strange Stories,
F(1,48)= 15.28, p< 3e−7; RMET F(1,48)= 1.177, p= 0.283.
RMET was the only measure that did not distinguish between
the two groups.
INDIVIDUAL ANALYSES OF ToM TESTS
Reading the mind in the eyes test
There was no significant difference in the performance on this test
between the two groups.
Faux pas
The performance of the clinical group was significantly impaired
compared with the non-clinical group on the Faux Pas test. Tests
of comparison of the differences in proportions revealed that the
clinical group had more difficulty than the non-clinical group
recognizing social faux pas (Q1: z=−5.87, p< 0.01), indicating
who made the faux pas and explain what it was (Q2-3: z=−11.82,
p< 0.01) and explain what the aggrieved party felt (Q6: z=−2.83,
p< 0.01).
The percentage of correct answers was particularly low (22%)
when the clinical group was asked to explain why the individual
faux pas (Q4) compared with the non-clinical group (83%). When
the participants gave an incorrect answer they were asked a sup-
plementary question in order to clarify their understanding of the
faux pas (Q5). The percentage of correct answers then increased to
63.4% in the clinical group and 95.4% in the non-clinical group.
Strange stories
The performance of the clinical group was significantly impaired
compared with the non-clinical group on Strange Stories. An
ANCOVA, controlling for FSIQ and schooling was used to com-
pare the performance on GROUPS (Clinical, Non-Clinical) and
STORIES (mental states, physical inferences) with repeated mea-
sures on the latter. The analysis revealed a main effect of GROUP
only [F(1,46)= 23.63, p= 0.00, d= 1.73] with no interaction
effect. The performance of the clinical group was impaired [Men-
tal States: M = 10.66 (SD= 3.51); Physical inferences: M = 9.29
(SD= 2.89)] compared with the non-clinical group [Mental
States: M = 14.90 (SD= 1.38); Physical inferences: M = 11.79
(SD= 2.63)]. A test of comparison of the differences in propor-
tions of the number of correct and wrong answers was then carried
out. The clinical group made significantly less correct inferences of
mental state and physical interferences (56.0 vs. 45.2%) than did
the non-clinical group (92.7 vs. 71.1%; Mental States: z =−8.73,
p< 0.01; Physical inferences: z=−5.32, p< 0.001).
Conversations and insinuations
The performance of the clinical group was significantly impaired
compared with the non-clinical group on C&I. An ANCOVA,
controlling for FSIQ and schooling was used to compare
the performance on GROUPS (Clinical, Non-Clinical) and
ANSWER (spontaneous, multiple-choice) with repeated mea-
sures on the latter. The analysis revealed a significant main
effect for GROUP [F(1,46)= 40.47, p= 0.00], and ANSWER
[F(1,46)= 5.29, p= 0.03] but no interaction effect. The clinical
group was significantly impaired compared with the non-clinical
group regardless of the type of answer and both groups improved
significantly when presented with multiple-choice questions.
Hinting task
The performance of the clinical group was significantly
impaired compared with the non-clinical group on the Hint-
ing Task. An ANCOVA, controlling for FSIQ and schooling
was used to compare the performance on GROUPS (Clini-
cal, Non-Clinical) and VERSIONS (1, 2), with repeated mea-
sures on the latter. There was a significant main effect for
GROUP only [F(1,46)= 61.63, p= 0.00, d = 1.82]. The per-
formance of the clinical group was significantly impaired
on both versions [Version 1: M = 15.39(SD= 2.54); Ver-
sion 2: M = 14.00(SD= 1.01)] compared with the non-
clinical group [Version 1: M = 18.48(SD= 2.33); Version 2:
M = 18.20(SD= 1.40)]. Tests of comparison of the differences in
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Table 2 | Correlation matrix ofToM test scores and subject characteristics.
RMET Hinting task Strange stories Faux pas C&I
Age 0.08 −0.26 −0.02 0.20 −0.19
Schooling 0.11 0.39** 0.30* 0.35* 0.33*
FSIQ 0.18 0.53** 0.52 0.31* 0.58**
*p<0.05, **p<0.01.
proportions of the number of correct and wrong answers were
then carried out. The clinical group made significantly less cor-
rect inferences in social situations than did the non-clinical group
(z =−11.32, p< 0.01). Although the percentage of correct infer-
ences increased in both groups when clues were given, the clinical
group still made less correct social inferences, 89 vs. 98.8%.
QUALITATIVE ANALYSES
Hinting Task
Two judges made an analysis of the three types of errors
prior to the cues and the results are considered acceptable
(κ= 78.62%). Further tests of comparisons (contingencies and
uniform adjustments) did not reveal any difference between the
groups (χ2= 3.63, p= 0.163) for any of the three types of errors,
all subjects confounded (χ2= 3.92, p= 0.141). The non-clinical
group made the same percentage of non-interpretative errors (19
vs. 30%), incomplete attributions (47 vs. 35%), and incorrect
attributions (33 vs. 35%) as the clinical group.
Strange stories
Two judges made an analysis of the percentage of the three types
of errors for the social inference questions and the results are
considered acceptable (κ= 84.85%). Tests of comparisons (con-
tingencies and uniform adjustments) did not reveal a pattern
difference between groups [χ2(2)= 0.19, p= 0.91] but did show
a significant difference between the three types of errors, when
the data from both groups is combined [χ2(2)= 9.54 p= 0.009].
There were significantly more non-interpretative (Σ= 36), and
incorrect attributions (Σ= 28), than errors of incomplete attri-
butions (Σ= 14). As well a supplementary analysis of the fourth
story of mental states attribution revealed that of the 21 clinical
participants, 14 were unable to correctly explain this story and of
these, nine thought that the woman was in fact going to drown the
kittens. Only two of the 29 non-clinical participants were unable
to correctly explain this story but none thought that the woman
would really drown the kittens. The story was chosen for a more
detailed analysis as the content allowed us to explore in more
details if the participants in the clinical group were more prone to
an interpretation that one could interpreted as paranoid ideation,
the participants’ belief that the woman really had a bad intention
toward the kittens (the intention of the woman to kill).
Faux pas
Two judges made an analysis of the percentage of the three types
of wrong answers to the fourth question and the results are
considered acceptable (κ= 81.19%). Tests of comparisons of per-
centages (contingencies and uniform adjustments) did not reveal
any significant difference between the two groups [χ2(2)= 3.57,
p= 0.17] but did reveal significant differences between the
three types of errors, all subjects confounded [χ2(2)= 46.31,
p< 9e−11]. The percentage of non-interpretative errors (Σ= 65),
was significantly greater than the percentage of errors of incor-
rect attributions (Σ= 37), that was significantly greater than the
percentage of errors of incomplete attributions (Σ= 7).
The two judges made a second analysis of the five types of
errors made on the fourth question and the results for errors
of incomplete attributions and incorrect attributions are consid-
ered acceptable (κ= 98.42%). Tests of comparisons of percentages
(contingencies and uniform adjustments) revealed significant dif-
ferences between the two groups. The clinical group had a signif-
icantly greater percentage of errors of “Bad intentions” (35 vs. 10,
z= 2.04, p= 0.04), “Don’t know” (17 vs. 0, z= 3.04, p= 0.0024),
and“Good intentions,”(8 vs. 0, z= 1.98,p= 0.049) while there was
no difference between the two groups for errors “Internal states”
(20 vs. 40, z=−1.15, p= 0.25) and “Personality traits” (20 vs. 50,
z=−1.70, p= 0.09).
Conversations and insinuations
Two judges made an analysis of the percentage of the three
types of wrong answers and the results are considered adequate
(κ= 81.61%). Tests of comparisons of percentages (contingencies
and uniform adjustment) revealed a pattern difference between
the two groups [χ2(2)= 10.61, p= 0.005]. The percentage of
non-interpretative errors made by the clinical group was signif-
icantly proportionally greater than that of the non-clinical group
[χ2(1)= 7.37, p= 0.007]. As well, the clinical group made signif-
icantly proportionally more errors of incorrect attributions, than
incomplete attributions [χ2(1)= 15.11, p= 0.0001]. The percent-
age of errors of incomplete attributions, however, was strictly
proportional to group size [χ2(1)= 0.006, p= 0.94].
ANALYSES OF ToM CONSTRUCT
Pooled within group correlations (i.e., correlations between the
variables without the effect of group), were obtained from a dis-
criminant analysis for the purpose of later decomposition by
principal component analysis (Table 3). The following correlation
matrix was obtained, where the critical values of the correlation
coefficient at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels are respectively 0.2816 and
0.3646 for a two-tailed test.
The discriminant analysis replicated the MANOVA but fur-
ther identified the dimension beneath the group difference. While
the structure matrix (correlations of the canonical variable with
the observed variables) had only positive values (Hinting Task:
0.832; C&I: 0.672; Faux Pas: 0.637; Strange Stories: 0.347; RMET:
0.096), the standardized canonical discriminant function coef-
ficients (i.e., the weights to apply to the standardized observed
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Table 3 | Pooled within groups correlation matrix.
Test RMET HT C&I ST FP
Correlation RMET 1 −077 0.111 −0.033 −0.098
HT −0.077 1 0.464 0.445 0.330
C&I 0.111 0.464 1 0.558 0.311
ST −0.033 0.445 0.558 1 0.405
FP −0.098 0.330 0.311 0.405 1
RMET, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; HT, Hinting Task; C&I, Conversations and Insinuations; ST, Strange Stories; FP, Faux pas.
RMET is not significant, the other correlations are significant at p<0.05.
variable to estimate the subjects’ scores on the canonical variable)
included one negative weight (Hinting Task: 0.663; C&I: 0.406;
Faux Pas: 0.447; Strange Stories: −0.351; RMET: 0.135). A diver-
gence in sign between the correlation and the coefficient for the
same observed variable is indicative of a suppressor variable effect.
This effect is, in this context, the presence of a source of informa-
tion that does not contribute to discriminating the groups but
contaminates other variables in expressing the underlying dimen-
sion on which the groups differ, making them less predictive than
they would otherwise be. Note that from the structure matrix, that
Hinting Task, with its correlation of 0.83 is the variable closest to
the underlying dimension.
To pursue this interpretation, step-wise logistic regression was
applied. At step 0, the table of variables not in the equation indi-
cated that RMET does not discriminate the groups (p= 0.274)
while the remaining four variables do so at p< 0.001. In the
forward step-wise mode,after the Hinting Task entered,all remain-
ing measured had p> 0.10. Thus, no other measure significantly
reduced the log-likelihood index, meaning that this variable cap-
tures the essence of what distinguishes the patients from the
controls. But because a suppressor effect was suspected, the back-
ward step-wise mode was called for. Reading Mind in Eyes was
first eliminated, followed by C&I, non-significantly increasing the
chi squared fit index (−2 log-likelihood) by 0.60 and 2.27 respec-
tively, for 1 degree of freedom each. At this point, removing either
Strange Stories or Faux Pas, in the presence of the other, increased
the chi squared by 4.72 (p= 0.03) or 5.40 (p= 0.02). Applied to
scores standardized over all 50 participants (i.e., irrespective of
group membership, the predictive equation is:
8.33 ∗ z (Hinting Task)− 2.42 ∗ z (Strange Stories)
+ 2.81 ∗ z (Faux Pas) .
Thus Strange Stories and Faux Pas appear to each contain
two sources of information, where an appropriate combination
of them cancels the dimension not discriminating the groups but
leaves information that reinforces group discrimination. The lat-
ter source of information does not have to be distinct from that
represented in the Hinting Task measure; it could be that it reduces
the estimation error contained in Hinting Task.
While analyses centered on functions that best differentiate
the groups indicate two underlying dimensions with a suppres-
sor variable effect, analyses based on the pooled within group
correlation matrix do not confirm this feature. As seen above, the
pooled correlation matrix indicate that RMET does not correlate
significantly with any other variable while all inter-correlations
among the remaining four variables are significant and positive.
Principal component analysis on all five measures hint at two
dimensions (by the Scree test and by producing two eigenvalues
above 1.0), but one dimension consists essentially of RMET. When
this variable is taken out, the first two eigenvalues are 2.27 and 0.73,
and the Scree test supports that there is only one dimension.
The number of dimensions was further questioned with struc-
tural equation modeling of the two covariance matrices (exclud-
ing the RMET variable), despite clearly too small sample sizes.
This indicated that a single factor with the same variance and
the same contributing weights in both groups is an acceptable
model (χ2= 12.8, df= 8, p= 0.12), although the RMSEA of 0.158
indicates lack of power to detect eventual model inadequacies.
DISCUSSION
PROFILE OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DEFICITS ON ToM TESTS
In this study, several steps were taken to control for sources of
variance that might affect internal validity: these included homo-
geneity of diagnosis, the relatively young age of patients, limited
chronicity, normal IQ, stability of medication prior to, and dur-
ing testing, mainly positive symptomatology during testing. It
should be noted that there were differences in cognitive func-
tioning between the two groups that might explain some of the
differences obtained on the ToM tests. These differences included
VIQ, PIQ, FSIQ and differences between the groups on the non-
ToM tests. After controlling for the confounding IQ factors, the
performance of the PScz patients remained impaired on four of
the five measures of ToM, relative to the non-clinical group. While
this basic result confirms those found in many previous studies
(Corcoran et al., 1995; Randall et al., 2003; Harrington et al., 2005;
Langdon et al., 2006; Bora et al., 2008; Montag et al., 2011), it
does not reveal much about the structure of ToM nor its clinical
significance in paranoid schizophrenia.
Of the five ToM tests, only the RMET did not distinguish
between the clinical and non-clinical groups. This result is in
agreement with Bora et al., 2008, but conflicts with that of other
studies (see for example Kelemen et al., 2005; Hirao et al., 2008;
Kettle et al., 2008; Bora et al., 2009a,b) which did find significant
impairment in PScz patients with this test. The explanation for
this seemingly paradoxical result is most likely found in the per-
formance of the non-clinical group. For reasons unknown, the
performance of this group of subjects [M = 21.68 (SD= 3.61)] is
poorer than that found in previous studies: de Achával et al., 2010,
M = 27.3 (3.8); Bailey and Henry, 2010, M = 27.3 (3.40); Craig
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et al., 2004, M = 27.63 (4.33); Riveros et al., 2009, M = 27 (4.16);
Schimansky et al., 2010,M = 25.5 (2.6), although there is only one
SD between this result and those reported by Schimanskty et al.
and at most 1.65 SDs between this study and the others cited (see
Craig et al.).
From the point of view of what the results reveal about the
structure of ToM, what should first be the difference in the amount
of shared variance between the tests (r2). Faux Pas shared the least
variance with the other tests (excluding RMET), with a shared
variance ranging from 9.67% (Faux Pas and C&I: r = 0.311,) to
20.25% (Faux Pas and Strange Stories: r = 0.405). In comparison,
the shared variance between Strange Stories and the other mea-
sures of ToM (excluding RMET) ranged from 10.80% (Strange
Stories and Hinting Task: r = 0.445) to 31.15% (Strange Stories
and C&I: r = 0.558). The shared comparison between Strange Sto-
ries and C&I contrasts with that between Faux Pas and C&I and
what is also notable is the difference in the pattern of correlations
between tests. One evident explanation for these results is that the
tests measure different dimensions of ToM in the Hinting Task it is
indirect messages, Faux Pas is self-explanatory. in Strange Stories it
is white lies, double bluffs, jokes, irony, figures of speech, and mis-
understandings; in the C&I it is faux pas; indirect messages, lies,
jokes, figures of speech, irony. Despite the fact that the mode of
presentation of Strange Stories and C&I differ, the two tests assess
a large variety of ToM dimensions and share similarities, sufficient
to explain why they share 31% of the variance (r = 0.558). The
absence of most of these dimensions in the other tests and the
unique social cognitive ToM dimension targeted in two (faux pas,
indirect messages), would explain the weakness of the correlation
between these tests and the others. Although the tests purport to
measure a common concept, ToM, some tests measure a unique
social cognitive ToM dimension and these dimensions appear tobe
dissociated. The pattern of correlations found in this study is par-
tially supported by the results in the Kosmidis et al. (2011) study.
These authors used seven measures of ToM in 28 patients with
schizophrenia and 30 non-clinical controls. Not all measures dis-
tinguished between the groups and not all ToM measures were
related in the clinical group. They concluded that not all aspects
of ToM were impaired, and the deficits were more isolated and
specific in their group, i.e., a dissociation in ToM dimensions.
The postulate that ToM is multidimensional is not novel.
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2007) and Montag et al., 2011 identified
a cognitive and an emotional dimensions. Bell et al. (2010) classify
ToM (and the tests used) into a mixture of content and con-
text. In their classification system of content, they identify a social
cognitive dimension and a social perceptual dimension.
Duval et al. (2011) present a different perspective, a model
of ToM that is composed of three modules, the first being com-
posed of two sub-modules first order of cognitive second order of
cognitive representations of the other. Next is a module of repre-
sentations of the intentions of the other then a module that is the
affective representations of the other. Faux pas would fit into the
module of first and second order representations, understanding
of intentions (“why did X say that?”) and emotions (“How does Y
feel when s/he hears what X said?”). Next, Faux Pas shares the least
variance with the other measures, confirming its independence
from the other modules, One might conclude that patients with
paranoid schizophrenia have some difficulties identifying socially
embarrassing situations in others (and most likely identifying it in
themselves; sub-module of affective representations of the other)
but this difficulty in social cognition is not as marked as their other
social cognitive difficulties. Their greatest difficulty is interpreting
contradictory messages, by messages that are not explicitly, specif-
ically expressed, that have to be contextualized in order to be able
to correctly infer the intended message.
The hypothesis of dissociable ToM dimensions was further
tested in this study, using a discriminant analysis, principal com-
ponent analysis and structural equation modeling. The results
furnish only indirect support for the hypothesis of multiple ToM
dimensions. Principal component analysis on all five measures
hint at two dimensions although further questioning the num-
ber of dimensions with structural equation modeling, despite the
small sample sizes, indicate that a single factor would be an accept-
able model. Lysaker et al. (2010) using a principal component
analysis on four purported ToM tests, identified one factor sin-
gle factor with an Eigen value of 2.26 (i.e., 56.5% of the variance
explained) to explain the variance. This value compares favorably
with that found in the present study (Eigen value of 2.27) and
this despite the fact that the battery included Picture Arrangement
(WAIS-III), a test that is not normally used to measure ToM, This
concordance contrasts with the results obtained by Mancuso et al.
(2011). Using a factor analyses, these authors identified three fac-
tors that accounted for 53.6% of the variance using a mixed battery
of eight subscales for three measures of social cognition, a test of
ToM, a test of attributional style, a test of facial expressions of
emotion. The three factors identified relate to the factor structure
of social cognition, not to ToM.
It was hypothesized that C&I would be the most sensitive of
the ToM tests as this is a dynamic, realistic test requiring on-line
encoding, and decoding of complex visual, and auditory, verbal
and non-verbal material. Performance on the C&I task was not
what was primarily affected in this group of patients. In fact, the
clinical group did not appear to be more perturbed by the com-
plexity of the ongoing social interaction in real time than they
were by the requirement to read between the lines of a series of
written scenarios and discern what the protagonist really meant.
The question is why are certain dimensions impaired in a specific
pathology and other dimensions less affected? What are the spe-
cific symptoms, and pathology that would explain this pattern?
In the case of paranoid schizophrenia, one of the symptoms that
has been cited is a problem of mentalization (Frith, 1992, 1994;
Montag et al., 2011). The picture is less definitive in the present
study. In the case of C&I, the percentage of non-interpretative
errors made by the clinical group was greater than that of the
non-clinical group, while the percentage of incomplete attribu-
tion errors was less in the clinical group. As well, within group,
the percentage of incorrect attribution errors made by the clini-
cal group was greater than the percentage of incomplete errors.
These results confirm at least one result found by Montag et al.
(2011). Using a similar format, a short movie task to measure
first- and second-order false beliefs, metaphors, faux pas, and
sarcasms, these authors also found significantly more literal inter-
pretations of mental states or overly simplistic inferences in the
group of PScz patients relative to the non-clinical group but
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not errors of social inferential reasoning that goes beyond the
bounds of the context when controlling for episodic memory and
errors on questions requiring reasoning not related to social infer-
ences. There is however, no indication of any difference between
the number of reduced ToM and excessive ToM errors in this
group.
In the case of the Hinting Task, the percentage of different types
of errors in the clinical group did not differ from that in the non-
clinical group. In the case of Strange Stories and the Faux Pas test,
there was also no difference between the two groups and the per-
centage of non-interpretative errors and incomplete attribution
was greater than the percentage of incorrect attributions errors for
both groups combined.
Corcoran (2003) presents the argument that the impaired per-
formance can be explained by a problem with inductive reasoning
in this population. If this were true one would expect a prepon-
derance of literal interpretations or “I don’t know” answers or that
the participants would tend to give more incorrect answers. In fact
the clinical group made the same percentage of non-interpretative
errors, as incorrect, as incomplete attributions as the non-clinical
group. They just made significantly more errors of each type than
the non-clinical group.
CONCLUSION
These results open the door to the possibility that ToM be subdi-
vided into separable dimensions: first and second order inferences
or beliefs, interpretation of intentions, interpretation of affect
(Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005, and on the basis of the social cog-
nitive ToM content: faux pas, interpreting indirect messages, lies,
irony etc., and contexts (cf. C&I). The ability to interpret depends
on an interaction between the neurologic systems that are affected,
the explicit and latent content in the message and the context in
which the message is expressed. The social cognitive content to be
encoded and interpreted has many dimensions and these dimen-
sions are dissociable within a given pathology or state of mind
of the participant. Each social cognitive ToM content inherent
in the task adds or subtracts a facet (prosody, facial expressions,
gestures, the manifest verbal content) that either facilitates the
interpretative process or impairs it. As well, the sensitivity and
specificity of the tests may vary between pathologies (Bazin et al.,
2009; Eddy et al., 2010; Ouellet et al., 2010). In order to best char-
acterize the deficits it would be advisable to use different tests of
ToM that target different content and contexts. Such an approach
would help to better inform us of the nature of the deficits and
the pathology. Finally, it should be noted that Hinting Task and
Strange Stories are probably better clinical instruments than the
C&I (or perhaps similar tests), not because they are significantly
more sensitive or specific in this population but because they
are more economical to use, require less time than C&I, and are
more frequently used is research with diverse populations. What
is missing are norms stratified for age and education for these
two tests, which would increase their clinical and experimental
utility.
These results need to be replicated with larger samples and in
different social economic groups in order to verify the validity of
the findings.
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